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Child Welfare Reform: the Impossible
Takes Longer in Illinois
Clara Ann Bowler*
The problem of providing for children without families has been with
us as long as family living has been the recognized means of preparing
young human beings for adulthood. Church, State and secular chari-
ties have all attempted to intercede on behalf of children and their
problems with varying success. Although twentieth century charity
has become a "social" science practiced by experts in "welfare," the
problem still remains.
Presently, children without families or with inadequate families are
cared for by a network of private, quasi-private and governmental agen-
cies. Because the courts have long had the final responsibility for de-
termining the relationship or lack thereof between family members and
the custody of minors, they have become a necessary partner of these
child welfare agencies. However, since the science of child welfare
has become more professionalized, the courts are less aware of what
happens to the child after he enters the child welfare network. This
lack of expertise, as well as crowded dockets, has made urban juvenile
courts a rubber stamp for welfare agencies, much like "delinquency
correctional" agencies. In Illinois, this ignorance has grown with recent
legislative attempts to re-organize the child welfare network under the
Department of Children and Family Services and to effect reform mea-
sures.
This article will survey the origin and effect of the new Department
of Children and Family Services in the Illinois child welfare system. It
will attempt to isolate certain problem areas in this new administrative
* A member of the Illinois Bar, Mrs. Bowler served as Staff Attorney with the
Juvenile Division of the Legal Aid Bureau of Chicago from 1969-1971.
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system and suggest reasons why it has not been successful in reforming
the child welfare network in Illinois. Finally, it will discuss the
relationship of the Department to the juvenile court and analyze various
methods in which the juvenile court could be used to promote the re-
forms which the Department has been unable to effect. Presently, the
juvenile court reform movement begun by In re Gault' has not been
applied to child welfare in Illinois as it has in New York and California.
Therefore, Illinois case law in this field is still limited. This discussion
is limited to child welfare problems covered by the Department of
Children and Family Services. No attempt will be made to discuss
problems arising under the federal/state aid to dependent children
plans.
I. HISTORY
The Illinois Department of Children and Family Services was created
in 1964 in response to the recommendation of the Illinois Report for the
1960 White House Conference on Children and Youth.2 Prior to this
time, the State of Illinois did not fully recognize a public duty to pro-
vide for dependent and neglected children.' The 1960 Report de-
scribed the situation as follows:
Since 1950 there has been little change in the general pattern of
child welfare services. Illinois is still primarily a private agency
state, with 130 agencies and institutions under religious, non-sec-
tarian, fraternal auspices, by chance located in selected sections
of the State. Public child welfare services are not only far over-
shadowed; they are held to a minimum. But the private agencies
are not totally private. Under the present pattern, many private
agencies could not exist without public tax funds, roughly 4.5 mil-
lion dollars a year . . . . This kind of quasi-private agency is the
primary child care resources in Illinois, second only to the Court,
which has over the years assumed a child-placement function,
either through its own probation staff or through use of the exist-
ing voluntary agency. . . . Public Service augments that struc-
ture to the extent that the State Division of Child Welfare can legally
serve veteran's children, and Cook County Division of Child Wel-
fare can legally serve only the children not accepted by private
agencies. 4
1. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2. Illinois Commission for the 1960 White House Conference on Children &
Youth, CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN ILLINOIS (1960) [hereinafter cited as 1960 ILLINOIS
REPORT].
3. 1960 ILLINOIS REPORT at 16, 18, 20.
4. 1960 ILLINOIS REPORT at 16. See also Illinois Governor's Commission on
Mid-Century White House Conference for Children & Youth, CHILDREN AND YoUTH IN
ILLINOIS (1950) [hereinafter cited as 1950 ILLINOIS REPORT].
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The view that neglected and dependent children are the responsibility
of private charities was so predominant in Illinois that the Cook County
Report for the 1960 White House Conference on Children and Youth
suggested that child welfare in Illinois was, in a sense, dependent upon
the success of the Community Fund money-raising activities.
The problem of voluntary agencies is highlighted by the failure of
the Community Fund of Chicago to reach its goal in each suc-
cessive year between 1945 and 1958. Voluntary agencies have
been under serious financial strain and have responded in this
period of rising costs by reducing staff, deferring needed mainte-
nance of buildings, and, in some cases, discontinuing service en-
tirely.5
Although the 1960 Illinois Report recommendations were aimed at
downstate areas where private agency facilities were inadequate or non-
existent, the 1960 Cook County Report documented the inability of pri-
vate agencies to cope with the sociological changes in the Chicago area
which had developed in the 1940's and '50's.6 The concept of a
State-administered and centralized child welfare program was advanced
to solve two very diverse and, perhaps, contradictory problems: 1)
lack of child welfare facilities and programs in low population areas
downstate, and 2) the breakdown of existing private child welfare fa-
cilities due to the disproportionate increase in numbers among low-
income and migrant populations in the inner city and metropolitan area
around Chicago. A uniform program was formulated to solve both
problems and was advanced in the Report of a Commission for a Com-
prehensive Family and Child Welfare Program in Illinois issued in Oc-
tober of 1962.7
The Committee Report recommended a major judicial reorganization
which would consolidate all legal actions regarding children under the
jurisdiction of a single Juvenile or Family Court. This Juvenile Court
was to have exclusive jurisdiction in all of the following matters relat-
ing to children: adoptions, legal guardianship of the person, divorce
and separate maintenance actions involving children, alleged depend-
ency of children, alleged neglect of children, alleged delinquency of
5. Cook County Report for the 1960 White House Conference on Children &
Youth (1960).
6. Id. at 2-8.
7. ILLINOIS COMMISSION ON CHILDREN, Report of a Commission for a Comprehen-
sive Family & Child Welfare Program in Illinois (Oct., 1962) [hereinafter cited as Com-
mittee Report]. The value of such a reorganization is obvious to anyone who has
been involved in a custody battle which rages simultaneously in Divorce or Probate
Court as well as Juvenile Court. See Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among
Infants, Their Parents and the State, 4 FAM. LAW Q. 320, 409 (1970), 5 FAM. LAW
Q. 63 (1971).
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children, alleged mental illness or deficiency of children and of adults
who are parents and/or legal guardians of children, alleged contribu-
tion to the neglect or delinquency of children by their parents, guardi-
ans, or legal custodians, and criminal non-support by parents of chil-
dren.8
The social service work of the Juvenile Court Probation Department
was to be continued by the new Family Court and was to include the
following responsibilities:
In matters of Petitions to establish legal guardianship for children:
To make such preliminary investigation and inquiry as need be
required, and,
To make recommendations to the judge as to the adequacy and
fitness of the nominated guardian.
In matters of alleged dependency of children:
To make preliminary investigation and to attempt to effect ad-
justment without formal court action, and,
To refer to licensed public or voluntary child welfare agen-
cies, cases of adjudicated dependent children ....
In matters of alleged neglected children:
To make preliminary investigation and referral . . . and to ef-
fect adjustment of such cases without formal court action if pos-
sible,
To provide emergency/temporary shelter care, pending court
hearing and disposition of case...
To provide family/child welfare services to adjudicated neg-
lected children, until such time as they will be otherwise avail-
able, and,
To review periodically the cases of adjudicated neglected chil-
dren .... 9
The Committee Report also recommended that the term dependent
child
concern[s] a child in need of court action through no fault of his
parents, including a child (a) without a parent or legal custodian
and in need of same, (b) in need of special services, whose par-
ents, although willing, are unable to provide for such services, and
(c) whose parents, with good cause, wish to be relieved of guardi-
anship and custody of that child.10
Such a definition would enable a poor parent to obtain government
funds for children who required special treatment outside the home
without submitting to a finding of neglect.
8. Committee Report, at 7.
9. Committee Report, at 31.
10. Committee Report, at 32.
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Further recommendations called for the creation of a statewide De-
partment of Family and Children Services which would include an ex-
pansion of the services "previously provided" by the Children's Divi-
sion of the Department of Mental Health, the public assistance pro-
grams of the Illinois Public Aid Commission and local General Assist-
ance, the services of the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation and the
Illinois Youth Commission. However, due to the fact that there was no
basic Family and Child Welfare Program in existence, the Committee
recommended that the proposed new Department initially include only
a casework division, a licensing division, an institutions division and re-
search. Services for crippled children, eye and ear infirmary research
and educational hospitals were to be left under the Higher Education
Board. Public Assistance, the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation
and the Illinois Youth Commission were to be added at a future time."
In 1963 the General Assembly passed the Department of Children
and Family Services Act which created a State agency to "provide direct
child welfare services when not available through other public or pri-
vate child care facilities."' 2  Although the Illinois Juvenile Court Act
was amended in 1965, there was no attempt to expand its jurisdiction
to include the recommended category of children "in need of special
services whose parents, although willing, are unable to provide for such
services."" Dependency was limited to children whose parents were
dead, physically or mentally disabled or wished to put the child up for
adoption. 4 A child needing special services whose parents could not
provide them had to be classified as neglected. Thus Ill. Rev. Stat.,
ch. 37, § 702-4(2) which prohibits actions brought ". . . solely for
the purpose of qualifying for financial assistance . . ." has been used
by parents who falsely admit to neglecting their child in order to qualify
for funds for special services.1 5
Thus, the Department of Children and Family Services was left with
the responsibility of creating a comprehensive program for Illinois chil-
dren under the traditional court system with its divided jurisdiction over
11. Committee Report.
12. ILL. REV. STAT., Ch. 23, § 5005 (1965).
13. ILL. REV. STAT., Ch. 37, § 701-08 (1965). See also, note 10, supra.
14. ILL. REV. STAT., Ch. 37, § 702-05 (1969).
15. Since 1970, the Chicago offices of the Department of Children and Family
Services have been mitigating the effect of this inconsistency by encouraging parents
in need of funds for special services for their children to enter into a "voluntary"
placement agreement with the Department under ILL. REV. STAT., Ch. 23, § 5005 and
5005.1 (1969). However, the "voluntary" agreement has not been available to parents
receiving Public Assistance in Cook County who are still forced to receive the De-
partment's services by means of a neglect proceeding in the Juvenile Division of the
Circuit Court of Cook County.
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the disposition of children.'" The Department was charged with the
responsibility for 1) establishing and maintaining tax-supported child
welfare services, 2) regulating adoption, foster care, family counselling,
protective service, service to unwed mothers, homemaker service, return
of runaway children, and "interstate services," 3) children committed
by the Juvenile Court for placement and 4) administering funds used
for child placement. The Department was also to operate six institutions
including an old people's home, provide services for the visually handi-
capped, operate an eye and ear infirmary, license child care facilities
under the Child Care Act' 7 and investigate child abuse cases.'"
The Department was also charged with providing counselling for
mentally retarded children "when not otherwise available."' 9  How-
ever, the Department has limited its service to short-term situations ra-
ther than long-term service.2" This means that families with retarded
children are without long-term public welfare services unless the child
is committed to the Department of Mental Health and institutionalized.
A similar gap remained in regard to pre- and post-institutionaliza-
tion services for mentally ill children. The Department does not accept
guardianship over children committed to the Department of Mental
Health by their parents, nor does it actively supervise its own wards
once they are "placed" in a Mental Health institution. If the child be-
comes eligible for discharge from a state hospital and the parents re-
fuse to accept the child back in the home, there is no public agency
which will take responsibility for providing placement or foster care.2 '
The result is that the child remains in the Department of Mental Health
until the parent decides to release him or he obtains the age of ma-
jority.
In August, 1969, the Cook County Department of Public Aid, Chil-
dren's Division, surrendered its guardianship over "nearly 6,000 chil-
dren" to the Department. 22  At the same time, the establishment and
16. See generally Kleinfeld, supra, note 7.
17. ILL. REv. STAT., Ch. 23, § 2211" (1965).
18. ILL. REV. STAT., Ch. 23, § 2041 (1965).
19. ILL. REV. STAT., Ch. 23, § 5005 (1969).
20. Haremski, Department of Children & Family Services Limits Service to Re-
tarded Child, 3 PERSPECTIVE No. 3, at 12 (Department of Children & Family Serv-
ices, 1967). But see Doctor's Convalescent Center, Inc. v. East Shores Newspapers,
Inc., 104 Ill. App. 2d 271, 244 N.E.2d 373 (1968).
21. In Doctors Convalescent Center, supra note 20, the court held that the place-
ment of a child in a public or private mental institution by the Department of Children
and Family Services is merely a "delegation" of their custody and control over the child.
Department representatives in Cook County have consistently interpreted this to mean
that once the child is committed to the Illinois Department of Mental Health, the
Department of Children and Family Services case is closed.
22. 5 PERSPECTIVE No. 3, at 10 (1969).
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maintenance of day-care facilities was added to the Department's re-
sponsibilities as well as a plan to subsidize adoptions of "hard-to-place"
children.
2 3
This gigantic task was designed to provide a gradual transition from
a quasi-private system of child welfare to a State supported and oper-
ated system. The transition was, however, to be implemented by "pur-
chase of care" agreements entered into by the Department with private
institutions and agencies. The expected effect in a state historically de-
voted to private responsibility for child welfare, was a parallel growth
and revitalization of both State and private child welfare programs.
Since the State had neither the facilities nor the personnel to take on the
entire task of providing child welfare services, Illinois could not afford
to admit that this parallel development of State and private facilities
might prove to be contradictory.
II. PRIVATE V. PUBLIC CHILD WELFARE
The regressive history of Illinois in the development of public child
welfare services has created a seemingly insoluble situation. Unfortu-
nately, present attempts to remedy this situation ultimately will lead to
exacerbation of the problem.
Illinois has developed a quasi-private market for child welfare serv-
ices. Private agencies, religious and otherwise, have long provided case-
work and placement services, foster homes and institutions. None of
these agencies are self-sufficient. They depend, in part, on direct finan-
cial aid from the government in the form of purchase of care orders.
The inadequacies of this system of private agencies have long been
recognized.24 The modern complaint is not the quality of services ren-
dered, but the lack of religious, racial and, especially, geographic equal-
ity in the distribution of services.2 5
What is not articulated is the deleterious effect these often excellent
private agencies continue to have on the development of public child
welfare services. A recent theory claims that the Juvenile Court Act
of 1899 was the result of the lobbying pressure of the private agencies
to promote the funneling of larger numbers of children through public
courts into private institutions at the County's expense.26 In effect,
23. ILL. REV. STAT., Ch. 23, § 5005 (1969).
24. See discussion in 2 G. ABBOTT, THE CHILD AND THE STATE, 15-17 (1938); 1950
ILLINOIS REPORT at 27-30.
25. 1960 ILLINOIs REPORT at 16, 18, 20.
26. One legal historian has gone so far as to blame the failure of Illinois to provide
adequate institutional facilities for children to a deliberate and successful lobbying cam-
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the Juvenile Court was a device to promote government subsidies to
private charitable foundations. If this theory has any validity, the
remainder of the vicious circle is inevitable. 7
The existence of private agencies blocked the creation of facilities to
implement the plans and jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court so that the
Juvenile Court would be driven to use their facilities. After the Court
became dependent upon the private facilities, and the public became ac-
customed to extensive Juvenile Court jurisdiction without public facili-
ties, it became more difficult to develop tax-supported facilities. Those
public facilities which were developed were financially starved and
plagued with bureaucratic and political incompetence.2" The more in-
adequate the public facilities became, the less willing the public was to
increase their financial support. Further, the private agencies justified
their continued existence by pointing to the inadequacy of public facili-
ties at the same time they were diverting public moneys away from these
public facilities into their own facilities. This depleted the resources of
public facilities still further and led to renewed support for private
agencies based on the inadequacy of public alternatives.
Eventually, the public facilities were so hopelessly inadequate and the
need so great 9 that the private agencies could not fill the need. At
this point, the private agency bloc was willing to support a public sys-
tem of co-ordinating, supporting and delivering child welfare services.
This reform may have been encouraged by the tendency of child wel-
fare services to fractionalize in the same fashion as the private services.
It was becoming difficult to secure governmental subsidies in any or-
ganized fashion at a time when both the need and cost of child welfare
services were increasing."0
When the Departmen of Children and Family Services was finally
organized in 1964 to provide child welfare services for all children in
Illinois, the only practical way to implement its plans was through the
purchase of child care from existing private facilities. The capital in-
vestment necessary for any other approach would have been more than
paign on the part of private child welfare agencies at the time of the enactment of
the original Juvenile Court Act. S. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Per-
spective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1225-1231 (1970).
27. Catholic agencies, in particular, were concerned that Catholic children could
only receive proper religious instruction in Catholic institutions. Fox, supra note
26, at 1228. In addition, a black, Protestant child in Cairo may have no services
available; whereas a white, Catholic child in Chicago would have several agencies
offering the same service.
28. See 1950 ILLINOIs REPORT at 27-30; 1960 ILLINOIS REPORT at 16, 18, 20.
29. Id.
30. 1960 ILLINOIS REPORT.
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the taxpayers would have accepted. 31 However, this purchase of care
approach, if enough money is allocated to make it successful, must lead
to a revitalization of private facilities. The funneling of State money
into private facilities will further inhibit the development of public fa-
cilities and the vicious circle will again begin.
This new approach, however, has the added danger, which is al-
ready becoming apparent, that the Department will attempt to control
the development of private facilities by imposing tighter restrictions.
These restrictions will eventually result in imposing the same bureau-
cratic and political problems on the private facilities as are prevalent
in public institutions. Such a development could ultimately lead to a
deterioration of private facilities to the same level of incompetence as
public facilities.
The optimist might argue that the intelligent use of the Department's
mandate to regulate private facilities will prevent such a development
from occurring. It is true that the present regulations published by
the Department are intelligent and practical.3 2 However, child welfare
being essentially a service commodity, regulations can be no better than
the personnel which enforce them. Unfortunately, personnel inade-
quacy has been a perennial problem for all public welfare agencies.
The same factors which have led to the inadequacy of public child
care facilities in Illinois also permit the private agencies to recruit and
maintain better staffs than public facilities. In the area of public child
welfare services, a qualified staff is the exception rather than the rule
due to the absence of civil service and the stiffling effect of the political
patronage system as it presently exists in Illinois. The inefficiency of
public staff, in turn, drives qualified young workers to seek employment
out of state or in private services. This, of course, is a drain on the
already inadequate supply of child welfare workers available in Illinois.33
In order to exercise intelligent control over private agencies, the
Department must attract and keep high-quality staff. However, it can
not retain such staff when the present supervisory staff is below the
standards of private agencies. The better quality young workers gravi-
31. Most Illinois taxpayers are not aware of how inadequate public child carefacilities in Illinois are. Despite many publicity drives, this lack of State responsi-
bility seems to be a "professional secret." However, the type of compromise solution
put into effect in 1964 was thoroughly discredited as early as 1938. G. ABBOTT, supra
note 24.
32. Illinois Department of Children and Family Services, Standards for Licensed
Child Care Institutions (1970).
33. Illinois Department of Children and Family Services, Biennial Report at 18
(1967-1968).
1972
Loyola University Law Journal
tate to private or out-of-state agencies, perpetuating the problem. Thus,
the inability of the Department to exercise control over child welfare in
Illinois leads to further abuses which make it more difficult to attract
the kind of staff which would perform more efficiently and compe-
tently.
The Department of Children and Family Services has an insoluble
problem. On the one hand, the State has insufficient financial and per-
sonnel resources to take immediate and exclusive control over all child
welfare services in Illinois.14  On the other hand, the present attempt to
compromise with the private agency approach to child welfare has the
effect of strengthening the same forces which make it impossible for
the State to ever take exclusive control. Thus, as the Department of
Children and Family Services succeeds in perpetuating its present mix-
ture of public and private services, it is reducing its opportunity to fully
provide the services it is mandated to provide, and to achieve adequate
child care in Illinois.
III. PROBLEMS OF THE 1970's
After six years of attempting to create a comprehensive child wel-
fare program in Illinois, the Illinois Commission on Children stated that
the first major problem in child welfare in the 1970's is "delivery of
services. '3' The 1970 Illinois Report predicts that:
The plight of the many thousands of children whose personalities
are severely damaged through poverty, racism and neglect will
shortly become a national scandal. 36
This break-down in "delivery of services" is traced to several trends
in agency practice as it presently exists in Illinois. The first is a hori-
zontal limitation of the type of service provided by any single agency
for a particular child.
Many agencies delivering service tend to become (agency) service
oriented rather than being oriented to the child and his family.
Each of the services to children is viewed as serving only that part
of the child's needs which conforms to the specialty of the agency.
The users of services are rarely consulted as to individual or com-
munity needs. 37
34. Federal programs such as the controversial child development program in S.
2007, 92nd Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) (vetoed by the President on Dec. 9, 1971) could
add both financial support and federal regulation to the Illinois scene. However, they
do not seem to be imminently forthcoming.
35. ILLINOIS COMMISSION ON CHILDREN, Report of Illinois White House Conference
on Children & Youth (May, 1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 ILLINOIS REPORT].
36. Id. at 12.
37. Id. at 13.
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Complementing the horizontal limitations on agency services are the
present financing systems which limit the vertical expansion of both pri-
vate and public agencies.
A predominant philosophy exists in Illinois that financing of serv-
ices should be made by a voluntary or governmental unit which
is at the neaiest level to the people who are users of the service.
In the past it has been possible for this philosophy to govern the
development of needed programs and priorities. However, the
present governmental units of townships, counties, municipalities,
etc., provide too small a population base or tax structure to ade-
quately fund or operate quality services to meet the needs. There-
fore, there has been a decided trend in the last ten years to looking
to a larger governmental or private unit to which responsibility
for programs would be assigned and funding required .... 38
After an analysis of "co-ordination" problems created by present
methods of federal funding, 9 the 1970 Report finds that there are seri-
ous problems in "co-ordination" among private agencies.
Voluntary [private] agencies share many of the same problems
in co-ordination seen in public agencies. In some communities,
there are too many small private agencies providing very similar
services. Besides the competition for staff among these agencies,
there is a gross waste of financial resources which could be reme-
died by realignment of services, consolidation of programs or mer-
gers of agencies. 40
Finally, the Report finds a serious lack of co-ordination and co-operation
between private and public welfare agencies.
All of these problems are understandable in light of Illinois' history
of child welfare and the compromise solution put into effect in 1964.
The long partnership between the Juvenile Court and private agencies
which began in 1899"' has resulted in public acceptance of the need for
private agency intervention on behalf of neglected and orphaned chil-
ren. The private and often sectarian origin and financing of these child
care agencies results in an emphasis on the interests of potential donors
rather than on the needs of the users of services. Citizens tend to con-
tribute to special projects which they believe will benefit the unfortu-
nate (i.e., a cure for cancer, blindness, etc.). Every voluntary donor to
charity is his own expert on what services are needed, and any service-
providing agency which is dependent on a continuous supply of volun-
tary donors must be limited by their peculiar notions and prejudices
38. Id. at 14.
39. Id. at 15-16.
40. Id. at 17.
41. Fox, supra note 26, at 1229.
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if it is to survive. The problem is not so much an "(agency) service
orientation," but a potential donor orientation.42
This orientation to the prejudice of the donor rather than the needs of
the recipient of welfare services can be as much a problem to public
welfare projects as it is to private projects.4" The government, how-
ever, has the advantage of being able to draw on a larger and more con-
tinuous pool of financial resources in order to maintain welfare pro-
grams already in operation. A public welfare agency is not dependent
on a continuous supply of individual voluntary contributions, but ra-
ther on a single act of the legislature. Once enacted, a legislative pro-
gram becomes, to a great extent, protected from the more transitory
shifts in public opinion . 4
The "philosophy" of financing at the lowest level is a direct result
of the pre-1964 practice of reimbursing private child-care facilities at
the county level,45 as well as the localized and complex distribution of
public assistance in Illinois. A complete overhaul of the federal Social
Security Act and the Illinois public assistance program is a prerequisite
to any comprehensive plan for public child welfare. Competition be-
tween private agencies and the resulting waste of financial resources is
inevitable under any state purchase of care program. 46  Finally, the
"lack of cooperation" between private and public welfare agencies
is a predictable result of the private agencies' peculiar role as both the
essential support and chief competitor of public agencies.47
To solve these problems, the 1970 Illinois Report recommended
a co-ordinated system of local and regional units for planning and
42. The authors of the 1970 Illinois Report, apparently do not feel that Depart-
ment of Children and Family Services' purchase of care arrangements have done much
to re-orient private facilities to the actual needs of children rather than the peculiar
specialties of the institution. Two factors may be responsible for this: (1) the
Department has been noticeably conservative about suggesting new approaches, and
(2) the shortage of child care facilities has created a permanent seller's market in
Illinois where the Department has difficulty finding any placement for many of its
wards.
43. Political pressure can be the strongest donor influence of all. The President,
in his veto of S. 2007, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), appealed to two contradictory
taxpayer prejudices about the basic employability of welfare mothers and the im-
morality of middle-class mothers who want to be employed. On the other side of the
political fence, the National Welfare Rights Organization has actively campaigned
against a guaranteed annual income because H.R. 1, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971)
could result in a decrease of dollar benefits to Organization members in large cities.
44. An example of this inertia is the federal social security program which some-
how has survived much popular criticism and several major shifts in political power.
45. County reimbursement of private agencies directly through the Juvenile Court
was the prevalent practice in DuPage County as late as January, 1970. Interview
with Richard George, Deputy Chief Probation Officer, October, 1970.
46. See discussion in part II at p. 55, supra.
47. Id.
Vol. 3: 49
Child Welfare Reform
community development which are representative of the various
interests and concerns for children's services. 48
The Report also recommended that the legislature designate a single
State Agency (Department of Children and Family Services?) to pro-
vide funding and staff for this planning system. There was no discus-
sion of how this planning system is to be effectuated or enforced. Nor
was anything said about the relationship between the regulating State
Agency and the private agencies upon which the State depends to pro-
vide most of the actual services. And, of course, nothing was said about
the ultimate causes of the "delivery of services" problem and what can
be done to counteract them.
The other significant problem of the 1970's involving the Depart-
ment of Children and Family Services is its relationship to the Juvenile
Court. The author has yet to speak with a judge, probation officer or
lawyer in the Juvenile Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County who
does not acknowldge this relationship as a major source of confusion
and frustration. There are signs that other counties in Illinois are be-
ginning to experience similar problems with the Department.
The 1970 Illinois Report attacks the problem directly. The Report
recommends that the Juvenile Court retreat and leave the disposition
of dependent and neglected children to the sole discretion of the De-
partment of Children and Family Services.
The sole responsibility of Juvenile Courts on dependency and negl-
lect cases should be that of providing legal protection through act-
ing on recommendations for changes in the legal relationship of a
child to his parents, guardian or other parties. This would mean
that the Department of Children and Family Services would have
the responsibility for such non-judicial functions as receiving and
studying complaints in dependency and neglect situations and de-
termining whether a petition shall be filed to secure Court action
when a child needs removal from his family, providing or financing
temporary or long-term foster family, adoptive or institutional
placement, determining the type of care a child needs, study and
supervision of foster care facilities and procuring of child care
services. These are child welfare functions and should be per-
formed by child welfare specialists.4 9
The Report rationale is that the present Juvenile Court role in de-
pendency and neglect cases was primarily an attempt to fill the gap
caused by the lack of local services and resources. Since the Depart-
ment of Children and Family Services had been in existence for six
48. 1970 ILLINOIS REPoRT, at 19.
49. Id. at 81.
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years, the Report believed that the time was ripe for the Juvenile Court
to turn over its child-placing functions to the Department which should
be better qualified to do the job.5" The Report apparently resented
the constant interference of the Department's placement and supervi-
sion of neglected children by lawyers, judges and probation personnel
in the Juvenile Court.
In theory, there is much to support the Report's position. Neither
probation officers nor judges are trained social workers. Nor is court
action an effective device to solve social and emotional problems. In
the past, court orders (which can be enforced by delinquency proceed-
ings and sentencing to the Department of Corrections) have placed
children in impossible or inappropriate situations. The author has wit-
nessed instances where probation officers insisted on bring children be-
fore judges to be ordered incarcerated instead of providing obviously-
needed medical or psychological treatment. Such court orders are
grossly inappropriate as well as emotionally harmful to the child. There
is also the vindicative parent who, after a finding of neglect, will bring
legal action to stop placement plan after placement plan on the theory
that "if I can't have the child, no one will."
However, the greatest dilemma facing juvenile judges, conscientious
defense lawyers and prosecutors is the total lack of any adequate remedy
for children mistreated by the Department of Children and Family
Services itself. The lawyer and judge in the Juvenile Court expect, as
a matter of course, the Department to provide good care for all the
neglected and dependent children brought into court. Instead, cases
such as the following occur:
1. A sixteen-year-old neglected girl with serious emotional prob-
lems is held in the juvenile detention home for over a year and in
solitary confinement continuously for two months because there is
no placement available. Eventually, she is placed in a foster home,
returned to the detention home and sent to a mental hospital, all
without notifying the Juvenile Court.
2. A nine-year-old deaf and dumb girl is held in the detention
home for nine months. She is rejected by the Illinois School for the
Deaf because of an old Board of Education I. Q. test which shows an
I. Q. of 45. Despite indications from caseworkers and employees at the
detention home that she is considerably brighter than the test score
indicates, she is never retested nor is the affect of her handicap on her
50. Id. at 66-67.
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I. Q. score evaluated. She is finally placed at a private institution for
mentally retarded children in Oregon.
3. An eight-year-old neglected "burglar" is held in the detention
home five months and placed in a foster home despite the recommen-
dations of the psychological and psychiatric reports which indicate in-
stitutional placement. The boy is arrested for another burglary and
the Department substitutes the Public Defender for the boy's lawyer of
record. The Public Defender pleads him guilty to the burglary charge,
he is committed to the Department of Corrections (at age nine) and
the Department is relieved of guardianship. 5
Although understandable in light of the impossible task confronting
the Department of Children and Family Services, such abuses are intol-
erable on an individual basis. And despite the abstract "due process"
rhetoric of the Supreme Court," it is practical administrative bungling
that has provided the real impetus of the Juvenile Court reform move-
ment.
IV. CHILD WELFARE AND JUVENILE COURT REFORM
Despite disagreement as to the underlying problems, it is clear that
the neglect and dependency branch of the Juvenile Court, like the de-
linquency branch, is not meeting its obligations to its wards. In de-
linquency actions, the last six years have brought a procedural "revolu-
tion" to American juvenile courts. Beginning with the Supreme Court
decision In re Gault 3 the appellate courts on the state and federal levels
have been limiting juvenile courts' broad jurisdiction over delinquent
children by means of distinctions adopted from modem criminal pro-
cedure. The theory of these decisions has been that juvenile courts do
not provide the rehabilitative "treatment," which they claim to provide,
and that the "treatment" provided, in fact amounts to little more than
incarceration and punishment. Since the result of being adjudicated a
"ward of the court" may also be incarceration and punishment, the
courts' jurisdiction should be limited by the due process considerations
developed in adult criminal or penal proceedings. The Supreme Court
has reasoned that because these due process rights would be available
to delinquent children if they were charged in an adult court, they
51. Cases from the legal files of Patrick T. Murphy and the Legal Aid Bureau,
Chicago, Illinois.
52. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). For a discussion of whether children actually
had due process rights before the development of the modem Juvenile Court see Fox,
supra note 26, at 1238.
53. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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should be made available to children in a delinquency proceeding in the
juvenile court where the sanctions, in terms of the possible duration of
incarceration, can be even more drastic.54
In Illinois, the Probation Department of the Juvenile Court has rightly
objected that the goal of these recent developments is to "get the kid
off" and block attempts to work with the child before he becomes a full-
fledged "criminal." The Juvenile Court is faced with an illusive choice
of dispositions in juvenile cases which sounds impressive in the stat-
ute,55 but in practice amounts to outright dismissal, probation in the
home or commitment to the Department of Corrections. Defense at-
torneys (and the United States Supreme Court) have operated on the
assumption that the Department of Corrections is an evil, probation is
arbitrary and ultimately leads to incarceration by the Department of
Corrections and that the job of the defense attorney is to keep the
court from adjudicating the child a delinquent in the first place. Mod-
em juvenile law practice has become an essentially negative effort where
unsupervised parental custody of the child is equated with liberty and
the greatest effort is expended to keep the child out of the clutches of
the juvenile court.
Such negative reform movements are encouraged by the persistent
tendency of modern juvenile courts to evade the effects of constitutional
due process requirements through the creation of arbitrary and unlim-
ited "children's offenses" such as the "Minor in Need of Supervision."5 6
The child "in Need of Supervision" has been clearly recognized by the
New York courts as an attempt to compensate for the lack of facili-
ties for neglected children by funneling the more difficult to place chil-
dren into correctional facilities.5 7 Both New York and California
courts have made substantial judicial attempts to limit the number
and quality of children falling into this category. 58
Although Illinois does not permit the placement of Minors in Need
of Supervision directly into the Department of Corrections, the Illiniois
Supreme Court has sanctioned the practice of issuing a "court order"
54. Id., but see Fox, supra note 26, at 1238.
55. ILL. REV. STAT., Ch. 37, § 705-7 (1969).
56. ILL. REV. STAT., Ch. 37, § 702-3 (1969).
57. In re Anonymous, 43 Misc. 2d 213, 250 N.Y.S.2d 395 (Farn. Ct., 1964); In re
Lloyd, 33 App. Div. 2d 385, 308 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1970); In re P., 34 App. Div. 2d 661,
310 N.Y.S.2d 125 (1970).
58. Bordonne v. F., 33 App. Div. 2d 890, 307 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1969); In re W.,
34 App. Div. 2d 1100, 312 N.Y.S.2d 544 (1970), aff'd 28 N.Y.2d 589, 319 N.Y.S.2d
845 (1971); In re A.A., 36 App. Div. 2d 1001, 321 N.Y.S.2d 59 (1971); In re P.,
12 Cal. App. 3d 1057, 95 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1970); In re D.J.B., 18 Cal. App. 3d 782,
96 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1971).
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to a misbehaving child and then making a finding of delinquency and
commitment to the Department of Corrections when the child violates
the "court order" by misbehaving a second time.5 9 The theory seems to
be that two acts of noncriminal "disobedience" constitute a criminal of-
fense. The actual explanation is that Minor in Need of Supervision is
almost always, by definition, a child whose parents are actively seeking
the assistance of the juvenile court in asserting their authority over the
will of the child,6° supposedly for the child's own good. Philosophically,
this is a more difficult situation for both defense attorneys and judges
to acknowledge than either the delinquent child and his adult parent
versus a citizen complainant, or the adult parent charged with child
neglect versus a social agency.
Therefore, although reform lawyers have not been able to resist the
Minor in Need of Supervision abuses in Illinois, they have been able to
carry on the reform movement into the area of child welfare by con-
testing neglect charges. The defense lawyer in a child neglect case has
always been a trusted agent of wealthy parents, and the expansion of
the Public Defender program, as well as federal legal services programs,
has made him available to poor and indigent parents as well.
The long term failure of the State to recognize an obligation to pro-
vide for neglected and dependent children and the inability of the new
Department of Children and Family Services to solve the child welfare
problems of Illinois have encouraged these activities. Lawyers and
judges who recognize that the State is unable to provide for dependent
and neglected children are becoming increasingly reluctant to remove
the child from the custody of his parents. More effort is expended in
getting the child out of court by contesting the neglect charge than in
finding an appropriate disposition for him after he is in court.
The first philosophical problem a defense attorney faces in child wel-
fare litigation is the issue of parental rights. The attorney, with some
support from Illinois case law, believes in a "natural" or "inherent right"
of a parent to the custody of his children.61 Whether this "inherent
right" is based upon the biological relationship between parent and child
or some traditional "sanctity" of the family is unclear.62 However, the
59. In re Presley, 47 111. 2d 50, 264 N.E.2d 177 (1970); In re Sekeres, 48 Ill. 2d
431, 270 N.E.2d 7 (1971).
60. Bazelon, Beyond Control of the Juvenile Court, 21 Juv. CT. JuDGEs J. 42
(1970).
61. Begar v. Seymour, 74 Ill. App. 2d 197, 199-200, 219 N.E.2d 265, 266 (1966);
In re Johnson v. Johnson, 30 Ill. App. 2d 439 (1961). For a controversial example of
Illinois' prejudice in favor of the biological parent see Huebert v. Marshall, - Ill.
App. 2d -, 270 N.E.2d 464 (1971).
62. An interesting theory of the origin of parental rights over a child was ad-
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constitutional and criminal law orientation of most defense attorneys
in Juvenile Court, together with case law insistence on "inherent paren-
tal rights," leads them to equate unsupervised parental custody of a
child with the child's liberty. An adult offender can be logically classi-
fied as "incarcerated" by the State or "at liberty." But it becomes mere
semantics to state that a child is "at liberty" when his natural parents
may take lawful actions more restrictive of his "liberty" than any State
institution.
The child welfare agencies, on the other hand, recognize a duty of
someone in society to defend the child against possible abuse by his
own parent, and intervene between the parent and child if necessary.
They feel that children have certain "passive rights"6 such as rights to
be fed, sheltered, educated and not physically abused. Viewed in this
light, a neglect proceeding is not depriving the child of his liberty, but
asserting his rights against his parent's wrongdoing. At the trial, the
issue becomes whether or not the parent did abuse the child's passive
rights to receive proper care and, often, what constitutes "proper care."
At this point, the same attorney who so passionately defended his ju-
venile client's right not to be adjudicated a delinquent minor, will just
as passionately defend the parent's right to do whatever he wants to
the child. The welfare worker now views the child's attorney, the great
defender of the child's liberty against interference by the State in a de-
linquency action, as the defender of the absolute power of a parent over
his child."4
vanced by the New York Supreme Court in Mercein v. People ex. rel. Barry, 25 Wend.
(N.Y.) 64, 102-03 (1840). "By the law of nature, the father has no paramount right
lo the custody of his child. . . . On the establishment of civil societies, the power of
the chief of a family as sovereign, passes to the chief or government of the nation.
And the chief or magistrate of the nation not possessing the requisite knowledge
necessary to a judicious discharge of the duties of guardianship and education of chil-
dren, such portion of the sovereign power as relates to the discharge of these duties,
is transferred to the parents, subject to such restrictions and limitations as sovereign
power of the nation think proper to prescribe. There is no parental authority inde-
pendent of the Supreme power of the State. But the former is derived altogether from
the later. . . . The moment a child is born, it owes allegiance to the government of
the country of its birth, and is entitled to the protection of that government. And
such government is obligated by its duty of protection, to consult the welfare, comfort
and interests of such child in regulating its custody during the period of its minority."
For further historical material, see G. ABBOT, supra note 24, at vols. 1 & 2. See also
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, Ch. 16 (3rd ed. 1768).
63. For a discussion of these "passive rights" see Kleinfeld, supra note 7.
64. Roman law recognized the absolute power of a father over the life and death of
his children on the theory that one who gave life could take it away. Blackstone,
however, states that a father's power over his children is given him by the State so that
he can exercise certain duties toward his children. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 62, at
§ 1 and 2. Most modern juvenile defense lawyers will agree that the State can inter-
vene in clear instances of attempted infanticide. However, their insistence on the
"natural" rights of biological parents often sounds more like Roman law theories than
common law.
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The second great problem for the attorney in dependency and neglect
proceedings is the reticence and perhaps inability of the court to demand
and enforce affirmative actions on the part of State welfare agencies.
The problem is compounded when all existing child shelters are filled to
capacity, or when no facility exists that can handle the child's problems.
The court must then decide between the only two places which it can
order a child to be taken-the county detention home (or jail) or the
Department of Corrections.
An appellate court in New York faced this problem in In re Lloyd.65
The Family Court attempted to dispose of a neglected child by reclassify-
ing him as a "person in need of supervision" and committing him to a
state "training" or correctional school for delinquents. The appellate
court reclassified him as a neglected child because
the provision of proper facilities is the responsibility of the legisla-
ture and the legislative failure in that regard does not warrant cir-
cumvention of the statute.66
The court then went on to outline the inadequacy of its own order:
Is this child then to be relegated to the custody of his mother under
conditions that the record shows have actually deteriorated since
the original, and justified, finding of neglect? It is easy to say, as
it is undoubtedly true, that it is not our problem. The court ob-
viously cannot provide a facility where none exists. We do not
give up, however, without a final gesture . . . . [W]e direct a new
adjudicatory and dispositional hearing in the hope that with the
lapse of time a place in some authorized agency may be found or
that the Children's Center may be able to make a viable adjust-
ment. 67
The Illinois Juvenile Court exercises its supervisory power over its
dependent and neglected wards, and the courts may demand periodic
reports of guardians and custodians including the Department of Chil-
dren and Family Services. 68 However, the only remedy against abuse is
removal of the guardian. Before 1964, when private agencies took di-
rect guardianship of their dependent and neglected children, the power
to change the child 's guardian may have had a real effect. However,
as the Department obtains a virtual monopoly of agency guardianship
over court wards, the threat to remove the Department as guardian be-
comes meaningless. The same difficulty arises in a possible neglect
action against the Department itself. If the Department is unfit to take
65. 33 App. Div. 2d 385, 308 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1970).
66. Id. at 421.
67. Id.
68. ILL. REV. STAT., Ch. 37, § 705-708 (1969).
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care of the child, who can? The guardian's report and supplementary
hearing then is an adequate remedy only for parents who are seeking re-
turn of a child previously taken away. When the issue is the proper dis-
position of a child who can not be returned to its parents, an attorney
or judge is reduced to harassing the Department's court representative.
An aggressive and independent attorney or judge can, by persistent
pressure, attack those abuses which originate in the negligence of the
Department itself, such as uncovered cases, incomplete social investiga-
tions and psychiatric evaluations, and lack of adequate medical treat-
ment.69 However, when a genuinely "difficult-to-place" child is before
the court, pressure on the Department simply results in an attempt to
place the child in the Department of Corrections or some other inappro-
priate setting.7° The author has witnessed numerous attempts to have
a difficult-to-place child of borderline intelligence adjudicated "mentally
retarded" so that he can be turned over to the Department of Mental
Health for institutionalization rather than "placed." The defense attor-
ney then finds that he has succeeded in pushing his client out of the
detention home into a "state school" of the Department of Mental
Health which may be even more inappropriate.
The same criticism can be made of the "right to treatment" cases in
the District of Columbia which evolved from analygous litigation over
inmates in mental institutions.7 ' The usual remedy to inadequate in-
stitutional care is release from the institution. In the case of neglected
children this remedy merely brings the court back to the original prob-
lem of placement of the child.
Some attempts have been made by the courts to control conditions
within state child correctional facilities through the judicial review of in-
stitutional rules and regulations and injunctions. 72  However, actions
such as the Lollis v, New York State Department of Social Services case 73
are usually based upon the unconstitutionality of specific treatment such
as solitary confinement which has been held not to constitute cruel and
unusual punishment as proscribed by the United States Constitution.74
69. In In re Hone I., 64 Misc. 2d 878, 316 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Fain. Ct., 1970) the court
released a child on probation because the training school to which she had been com-
mitted refused to submit a progress report to the court and provide psychiatric
treatment as ordered.
70. In re Lloyd, 33 App. Div. 2d 385, 308 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1970).
71. Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967); In re Elmore, 382 F.2d 125
(D.C. Cir. 1967).
72. E.g., Lollis v. New York State Department of Social Services, 328 F. Supp. 1115
(S.D.N.Y., 1971).
73. Id.
74. Sostre v. McGinnes, 442 F.2d 178 (2nd Cir. 1971).
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There is, of course, the classical remedy of a suit for damages.7 5 How-
ever, this remedy seems only to be applicable in instances of recklessly
negligent mistreatment by a few specific individuals after the child has
already sustained substantial injuries.
The only effective legal remedy in placement cases seems to be for the
court to place the child directly with the appropriate child care facility
or foster home itself. This, of course, is exactly the situation which
the Department of Children and Family Services was created to avoid
because it has worked so poorly in the past.
One helpful approach to the disposition of neglected and dependent
children is a hearing procedure within the Department itself with a pro-
vision for administrative review in the Juvenile Court. Such a scheme
would require the appointment of a guardian ad litem for each ward of
the Department who would be charged with interceding on behalf of
the child with the Department to correct abuses and object to inappro-
priate placements both within child care facilities and outside the De-
partment; i.e., to the Department of Mental Health or Corrections."
The guardian ad litem could deal directly with caseworkers and place-
ment personnel informally and at administrative hearings rather than as
the "court representative."
In Illinois, there is presently no appeal from dispositional decisions
of the Department of Children and Family Services except through the
"report of guardian" hearings in the Juvenile Court. 77  Certain final
administrative decisions of the Department are, by statute, subject to
judicial review under the Administrative Review Act. 78  Whether or
not the Administrative Review Act applies to the Department's exercise
of power under Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 23 § 5005 is unclear, but of no sig-
nificance since review can only be had from decisions which both "ef-
fect the legal rights, duties or privileges of parties and which terminate
the proceedings before the administrative agency."'79  Obviously, place-
ment proceedings can not be terminated by the Department until the
child reaches majority or the Department is relieved of guardianship.
75. Roberts v. Williams, Civil No. 28829 (5th Cir., Apr. 1, 1971), CCH Pov. L.
REP. 13,017 (1971). Prison farm superintendent was liable for injuries to juvenile in-
mates from shotgun blast fired by prison farm trustee.
76. The value of aggressive guardians ad litem in bringing child welfare abuses to
the attention of the courts has been clearly demonstrated by the actions on behalf of
neglected children raised by New York law guardians appointed under N.Y. Family
Court Act, § 243, 249 (McKinney 1966). In re Lloyd, 33 App. Div. 2d 385,
308 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1970); In re P., 34 App. Div. 2d 661, 310 N.Y.S.2d 125 (1970);
In re Ilone 1., 64 Misc. 2d 878, 316 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Fam. Ct. 1970).
77. fIEi.. REV. STAT., Ch. 37, § 705-708 (1969).
78. ILL. REV. STAT., Ch. 110, § 264 et seq. (1969).
79. ILL. REV. STAT., Ch. 110, § 264 (1969) (emphasis added).
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An effective administrative review would require legislation enabling
the Juvenile Court to formally order the Department to change a place-
ment plan when it was satisfied that such plan was inappropriate to the
extent of being an abuse of the Department's discretion. Under the
present Juvenile Court Act, it is questionable that the court has the
power to order the Department to make a new placement without re-
moving the Department as guardian.8" Further, an army of independ-
ent guardians ad litem with legal assistance would be necessary to pre-
serve their independence from the Department. Perhaps this is totally
unrealistic in a State which has yet to fully commit itself to providing
for its neglected and dependent children. Yet lawyers have been tradi-
tionally more successful than social workers in gaining the support of
the powers of government. Their interest, as a force in itself, may do
more for child welfare than any elaborate plans or theoretical consid-
erations.
80. ILL. REv. STAT., Ch. 37, § 705-7 (1969); Doctor's Convalescent Center, Inc.
v. East Shores Newspapers, Inc., 104 Il. App. 2d 271, 277, 244 N.E.2d 373, 377 (1968).
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